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THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN: EXPLORING THE PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION
IN INTRASTATE WARS.
REVIEW BY Jot-IN D. BECKER*
LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN, Anduu
E.Wall, (Ed.), International Law Studies, Volume 78, U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2002.
Kosovo stands as a symbol for many things in the world of international
security affairs. First, it stands for intrastate war in a multi-ethnic society Second,
it stands for the role of collective action by regional organizations in intrastate
wars. And lastly, Kosovo stands for the problems of fighting in interstate wars by
regional organizations. Accordingly, many recent texts have looked to Kosovo as
a case study for modem war. Popular works like Waging Modern Wars by
General Wesley Clark and War in a Time of Peace by David Halberstam are
reflective here. More scholarly works are following in kind, including Legal and
EthicalLessons of NA TO's Kosovo Campaign,edited by Anduu Wall.
Wall's text contains the proceedings from a scholarly colloquium entitled
Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign hosted by the Naval War
College on August 8-10, 2001. The colloquium looked at the international and
legal lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo conflict from the standpoint of
jus ad bello concerns. In other words, consideration was given to issues relating to
the conduct of hostilities, rather than the jus ad bellum questions regarding the
legal justification of NATO's initiation of the air operation in Kosovo. A variety of
scholars and practitioners participated in the colloquium including representatives
from the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, the Center for
National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, Duke
University of Law School, and the United States Naval War College, as well as all
the branches of the U.S. military and military allies from NATO to Israel and even
Sweden and Switzerland.
The opening remarks by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, then-President of
the Naval War College, are insightful in two regards. First, unlike many postconflict conferences, Cebrowski notes this one is not focused on lessons learned,
rather it is on lessons to be examined. The distinction is important in that only the
future will show if the lessons have in fact been learned. Additionally, and
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probably more importantly, Cebrowski talks about the linkage information age and
modem warfare. This nexus was first seen in the Gulf War and is now more in
evidence in campaigns like Kosovo and Iraq war.
The information age has been characterized by three trends-networking,
greater globalization and economic interdependence, and technology assimilation.
Each of those trends, in turn, has enormous implications for societies and their
militaries throughout the world. These changes have been analogized as
significant as the change from the agricultural age to the machine or mechanical
age.
Network-centric warfare most notable enables a shift from attrition-based
warfare to a much faster effects-based warfighting style, characterized by
operating inside an opponents decision loop by speed of command as well as by a
change to the warfare's context or ecosystem. In theory, at least, the result may
well be decisional paralysis.
It is forth noting here that network-centric warfare is the generational
successor to what was called maneuver warfare in post-Cold war defense analysis.
This movement, initially articulated by a group of young Turks in the Army and
Marines in the late 1980's and early 1990's, challenged traditional military
doctrine and standards and opened up the fields to extended discussion both within
and outside the military profession. This author was exposed to this group of
reformers and their ideas during an assignment to West Point at that time.
The approach itself is premised on achieving three objectives: first, the force
achieves information superiority, having a dramatically better awareness of the
battlespace; second, forces acting with speed, precision, and the ability to reach out
long distances with their weapons achieve the massing of effects versus the
massing of forces themselves; and third, the results that follow are the rapid
reduction of the enemy's options and the shock of rapid and closely coupled
effects in his forces. This disrupts the enemy' strategy and, hopefully, forecloses
the options available to him.
Underlying this ability is an alteration in the dynamics of command and
control. The key to this possibility is the ability to provide information access to
those forces that need it most at the time they need it most. Traditional military
notions of top-down command and control are replaced by new bottom-up
executions and organizational structures.
With that change, a number of
challenges result form this new type of warfare and the text looks at three major
ones.
They are found within the area of jus in bello and include: i) targeting, 2)
collateral damage, and 3) coalition operations. In fact, the text is broken into three
parts reflecting these areas, framed by an introduction, by keynote speakers and a
conclusion, looking to the road ahead.
Among the more interesting insights provided are those by conference
speakers, the Honorable James R. Baker and Air Force Lieutenant General
Michael Short. Baker, now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, served as Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to
the National Security Council during the Kosovo campaign. Short, now retired
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from active duty, served as the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Forces, and
commanded NATO's Kosovo air campaign.
Baker argues that lawyers have a legitimate role in military operations,
including in the vetting process of targets, targeting sets, and targeting in general.
Lawyers, however, not always readily accepted in the military targeting team, for a
variety of reasons including concerns about secrecy, delay, lawyer creep
(analogous of mission creep, where one legal question becomes ten legal questions
and which requires not one lawyer to answer but twenty lawyers to answer those
legal questions).
Baker also forecasts three areas of tension between doctrine, policy and the
law of armed conflict. The first of these, between Proportionality, Necessity and
"Going Downtown, is the tension between the legal constraints ofjus in bello and
the military importance of striking hard at the start of a campaign to surprise and
shock the enemy and thus, rapidly end the campaign. This was most recently seen
in the Iraq War with the "Shock and Awe" campaign that kicked off the war. The
second area is seen in dual-use targets, those targets which have both military and
civilian objects, and accordingly the tension is found between effects-based
targeting and the law of armed conflict. The attacking of convoys and bridges in
Kosovo fell into this category. The third area is in the tension between the
protection of noncombatants and the traditional understanding of military
objectives. Specifically, this is expressed in the question of legally killing military
(and political) leaders? This too was seen in the Iraq War with the decision to
launch a missile attack against Saddam Hussein, based on intelligence reports
which put him in a suburb of Baghdad. He concludes with the message that
lawyers remain integral to the conduct of military campaign, particularly at the
national command level, that the law of armed conflict is hard law, and that the
application of the law armed conflict is a moral imperative.
General Short's remarks follows along the same topics Baker raises but his
answers differ since his perspective is that of military commander-a professional
soldier. And Short is clear about what he thinks here. Targeting is a shared
responsibility but only in that the President and the National Command Authority
should only be concerned with approving targeting sets---command and control
nodes or power grids, for example. Individual targets that are not to be targeted
should be put on a no-strike list. Once that is done, the commander and his forces
should be allowed to get on with their mission and achieve the effects as rapidly as
rapidly and with as little loss of life and as little destruction of property as possible.
The general also notes that anyone who understands anything about modern
warfare knows that responsible commanders always take every possible step to
limit collateral damage. But the job of a commander, and his staff of advisers, is to
balance concern for collateral damage and concern for loss of life on the one hand
with the risk you are asking your pilots to take. Citing an example from the
Kosovo campaign, the bombing of a bridge outside of Nis, he notes that some Serb
civilians were killed in an attack on the bridge. Milosevic quickly lined up the
dead and brought down the international press from Belgrade to show off the dead.
This had a CNN-effect on the Clinton administration and our NATO allies,
resulting in unconscionable restrictions on bombing that target: only at night
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between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. and no bombing on weekends. The lesson taken away
here ought to be that bombing, under any circumstances, is a difficult mission and
putting unreasonable restrictions on that mission may limit civilian deaths but it
also increases risks to friendly pilots, who are a valuable and limited resource. It
may also encourage the enemy to take advantage of those imposed limitations and
continue their campaigns of terror.
Finally Short acknowledges that while the United States should never
undertake a military campaign alone-a lesson somewhat lost on the Bush
Administration in the recent Iraq War-he also notes the difficulties involved in
coalition warfare and military operations. Unlike the Persian Gulf War, where the
norm was simply if your nation wanted to join the coalition of the willing, then you
had to follow the coalitions' rules, it was different in the Kosovo campaign. Since
NATO was an established regional organization that was fighting the war, albeit
under U.N. Security Council resolutions, the decision-making process was set and
accordingly, different. Each and every nation had to approve and agree on targets
and target sets, to the point where a small nation member could effectively veto
targets that a larger nation member might approve and want to strike. Likewise,
some nations had much more restrictive guidance and other nations did not. The
result was a complex targeting process, where specific state's military aircraft
could be used on some missions and not others, where approval of bombing
missions might be scratched in the air if approval was not granted in time, and
where some restrictions applied sometimes and not other times, depending on
where the combatants were in the timeline of the war (in other words, restrictions
were less severe in the early days of the war than later in war, when they were
much more demanding and controlling).
General Short concludes by noting that lawyers, particularly military lawyers,
have an obligation to keep the commander within the bounds of the law, while
conducting a military campaign. But, the job of the military lawyer is not to keep
the commander from doing his job; rather it is to make it possible for the
commander to do his job, without breaking the law, without blowing up things that
shouldn't be blown up, without killing people who should not be killed, and
without committing war crimes. And most importantly tell the commander the
truth, even when he or she doesn't want to hear it.
Moving into the core of the book, Parts 1II, IV and V dealing with Targeting,
Collateral Damage, and Coalition Operations respectively, a number of voices are
heard. There is little agreement on all the issues but much insight to found. For
example, Scott Silliman, a Duke University Law professor, notes while the precise
linkage between jus ad bellum concerns and jus in bello concerns is not completely
resolved, there is an important connection here. Whether one takes the 1950's
view that the good guys, because they are good guys fighting a good war, don't
have to follow jus in bello rules (which ultimately is problematic) or the more
nuisanced view, that since self-defense is the only basis for lawful conflict, then
the conflict must be measured by both jus in bello rules and if it complies with
necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense, the link between the
two concepts is an overarching concern.
Christopher Greenwood, Ivan Shearer, George Walker, and John Norton
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Moore, to name but a few of the commentators here, discuss other issues like
whether members of the armed forces of a party to an international conflict who
find themselves in the power of the enemy are prisoners of war or not; whether it
matters, in terms of legitimacy and the applicability of laws, if interventions are
U.N.-based or regional-organizationally based; and whether the law of armed
conflict always apply, regardless of the type of conflict or the parties to the
conflict?
So it is clear that this text provides a broad and thorough consideration of the
legal and ethical concerns of fighting modern war, specifically as viewed through
the lens of the Kosovo campaign. It also suggests that the Kosovo experience can
be most fruitfully used for scholars and practitioners. As Joel Rosenthal notes
introducing the concluding section, we need to be able to see the choices clearly
and be able to articulate the principles upon we make our decisions.
We also need to consider several inclusive legal and ethical issues stemming
from rapid geopolitical and technological changes. These include recognizing that
the law needs to keep up with those changes to be relevant, we need to carefully
consider if we want to change that law from one focused on armed conflict to one
focused on international human rights, and whether we can or even should try to
learn lessons from history. These considerations will, hopefully, shed some light
on the road ahead.
In sum, Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign provides a
nice summary of the difficulties found in waging modern warfare, including
humanitarian interventions in intrastate wars, where jus ad bello concerns have
become a dominant concern. It also helps us understand the difficult and complex
nature of fighting war within the constraints of an established coalition and
regional organization like NATO. One common criticism of U.S. action in the
post-9-11 world has been its reliance on unilateral action. The problems and
difficulties in fighting the Kosovo campaign suggest the other option-multilateral
action-is not always the easy alternative to fighting wars.
Additional Comment:
Immediately after this review was prepared-March, 2004-fighting once
again broke out in the Balkans. Erupting in the divided city of Mitrovica, clashes
between Albanians and Serbs across Kosovo resulted in a handful of deaths and
hundreds of injuries including U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N., according to reports
by the New York Times, has lost control of several city centers throughout Kosovo.
NATO responded by sending an additional 1,000 reinforcements to the already
18,000 troops in Kosovo.
Coming almost five years after the NATO intervention, the most recent
clashes show at least two things. First, ethnic divisions in multi-ethnic states
remain will remain for years and years, no matter the kind or type of interventions.
Given that these divisions are often grounded in history and culture that extends
for many generations pnor to the present day it is sheer lunacy to assume that a
few years of monitoring and controlling outward violence will change those
divisions. Changing a culture-be it in an organization or a state-requires both
strong leadership and long-term commitment, by the party desiring it. Second, the
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relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations remains problematic in
dealing with these kinds of conflicts. In past conflicts, there has not been the
luxury of having regional forces available for almost immediate action. Somalia,
Rwanda, and Haiti all come to mind as places where no regional organization was
in place to work in conjunction with the U.N. In Kosovo, the U.N. is able to rely
upon NATO to immediately deal with the problem of renewed conflict. But that
reliance is not based upon communication and cooperative arrangements between
the U.N. and the regional organization NATO. Rather, the regional organization
deals with conflict as it sees fit. This is not the spirit or the intent of Articles 39-42
of the U.N. Charter, much less with Article 2(4), which is often considered the
heart of the Charter.
Any long-term success in Kosovo is contingent upon recognition of these two
factors and incorporation of them in the planning and executions of the operations
for peace making and peace enforcement.

